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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This matter is before the Court pursuant to its grant of Appellants, Tracy Cannon's
and Cannon Associates, Inc.'s ("the Cannons"), Petition for Writ of Certiorari of the
Utah State Court of Appeals' Decision affirming the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis' Order
denying the Cannons' request for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2001 UT App. 48, 21 P.3d 235. The Utah
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to UT. Const., art. XIII, § 5
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2001 Supp.), and Rules 45 and 51 Utah R. App. P.
(2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the Court of Appeals' correctly affirmed the trial Court's finding the
Cannons were not entitled to recover attorney fees from Appellee Wardley Better Homes
& Garden ("Wardley") because the claims that Wardley litigated in the trial court were
not without merit and were not pursued in bad faith.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Cannons correctly state that "on Certiorari [this Court] review[s] the Decision
of the Court of Appeals not of the trial court." Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, % 25,
20 P.3d 876 (quoting Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89,115, 16 P.3d 540; and Lysenko v.
Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, H 15, 7 P.3d 783). The Cannons, however, over-simplify the
Court's standard of review in this case by asserting that this Court only needs to review
the Court of Appeals' Decision for correctness without any deference to its conclusions

of law. The Cannons' Brief at 1 (quoting Esquivel v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT 66, f
11,7 P.3d 777; and Bear River Mut Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, \ 4, 978 P.2d 460).
This Court must initially "examine whether the Court of Appeals applied the
correct standard of review to the trial court's decision . . . " Lysenko at % 15.
Furthermore, while legal decisions are reviewed for correctness without deference, all
factual determinations and any inferences that can be drawn therefrom must be viewed in
the light most favorable to Wardley. Rawson at \ 25 and Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v.
Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856.
While the question of whether Wardley's claims were "without merit [] is a
question of law" reviewed for correctness, Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah App.
1991), the determination that Wardley did not pursue its claim in "bad faith is a question
of fact and is reviewed by [the appellate courts] under the 'clearly erroneous' standard."
Id. (citing Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 & n. 5 (Utah 1987); and Canyon
Country Store v. Bracey 781 P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1989) (determination of bad faith
reviewed for an abuse of discretion)). This Court has recognized that a "finding of bad
faith is a mixed question of law and fact that turns on a factual determination of a party's
subjective intent." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315-16 (Utah 1998) (citing
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah App.1989)). Additionally, in
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998), this Court clarified the
appropriate standard of review for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56 by stating that "[t]o clarify the matter: As to whether the party lacked good

faith, the trial court must make a factual finding of a party's subjective intent. In
addition, the trial court must conclude, as a matter of law, that the action was without
merit." Id. (emphasis added).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 governs the award of attorneys fees where a meritless
claim or defense is asserted by a party in bad faith. It states:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except
under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in
the action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding
fees under the provisions of Subsection (1)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
OBJECTION TO THE CANNONS' STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND THE FACTS
Wardley objects to the Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts as set forth in
the Cannons' Brief because those sections of the Cannons' Brief, misrepresent, confuse
and ignore the evidence and the basis for the Court of Appeals' Decision .
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Utah Court of Appeals Decision in Wardley v.
Cannon, 2001 UT App. 48, 21 P.3d 235, as well as the trial court's ruling denying the
Defendants' request for attorney fees (R. 1171-77 attached hereto as Addendum A),

portray the nature of this case and many of the relevant facts much more accurately than
the Cannons' statement and facts.
Examples of objectionable and distorted representations include the following:
The Cannons consistently refer to a fraud perpetuated by Aries Hansen
("Hansen"), an agent of Wardley. The Cannon's Brief at 2. However, the trial court
actually ruled and the Court of Appeals recognized that the incorrect dates on the listing
agreement were different than anticipated by the Mascaros, but only made them voidable
not void. Wardley v. Cannon, at f 3. Similarly, the Cannons fail to discuss any of the
time, efforts and expenses Hansen utilized while trying to find a buyer for the Mascaro's
property during the claimed term of the listing agreement.
The Cannons also fail to point out that an early Motion for Summary Judgment
was denied because there were material facts at issue. Furthermore, the trial court
rejected Motions for a directed verdict at the close of Wardley's case in chief and did not
rule against Wardley until after "[a]fter four days of 'carefully evaluating the trial
testimony and carefully scrutinizing the numerous documents entered into evidence.'"
R.1173-74
Finally, the Cannons gloss over the fact that after sitting through four days of
testimony, the trial court took over two months to render a decision. Thereafter, in
response to the Cannons and Mascaros' request for attorney fees, the trial courts found
that Wardley's suit was not "without merit" and even though the listing agreements
entered between Wardley and the Mascaros were voidable because of Hansen's

misconduct, the legality of the listing agreements consisted of mixed factual and legal
questions which were not entirely clear. There was no evidence that Wardley knew of
Hansen's fraudulent conduct, or that it: (a) did not honestly believe in the propriety of
the claims; (b) intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (c) acted with
knowledge that its activities would hinder, delay, and defraud Cannon or the Mascaros.
R. 1173-74 and 1266 (Order Denying Attorney Fees, attached hereto as Addendum B).
The trial court also found that Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad
faith, R. 1174 and 1266, and stated "the totality of facts and circumstances don't point to
[Wardley's Payment of the Cannons' fees] as equitable." [R. 1175]. Because the
Cannons have not marshaled any evidence or challenged any factual determinations
below, this Court cannot know the facts and circumstances that support the decisions of
the trial court and Utah State Court of Appeals.
NATURE . PROCEEDINGS. FACTS AND DISPOSITION OF CASE BELOW
This case was originally filed by Wardley against Defendants Leland and Sheri
Mascaro ("the Mascaros") to recover a real estate commission Wardley believed it was
entitled to recover because of four listing agreements signed by the Mascaros. [R. 12-15
and 287-90]. The Mascaros Answered Wardley's Complaint and asserted a
Counterclaim against Wardley and a Third-Party Claim against Third-Party Defendants,
Ruth and Aries Hansen ("the Hansens") who were licensed real estate agents affiliated
with Wardley. [R. 28-39]. Thereafter, Wardley filed an Amended Complaint asserting
claims against Tracy Cannon for Unlawful Interference with Contract, Conspiracy and

seeking a Declaratory Judgment. [R. 81-90]. Later Wardley amended its Complaint and
asserted causes of action against Cannon & Associates, including claims for statutory
violations and conversion. [R. 277-82]. The Cannons answered Wardley's Complaint
but did not assert any counterclaims against Wardley nor any cross-claims against the
Hansens.
Tracy Cannon filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming there were no
disputed material facts. The trial court denied that Motion because "there [were]
materials facts at issue." [R. 268-70].
This case was tried over four days utilizing the testimony of 14 witnesses and 95
exhibits (65 of which were received into evidence). [R. 845-46, 851-52, 895, 926-27
(witnesses) and 847-50 (exhibits)]. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Lewis found no
cause of action against Tracy Cannon on the violation of statute or rule claims and
determined that Wardley had failed to meet its burdens of proof on its claims against the
Cannons for interference with the contracts or conversion. Wardley's other claims,
however, against the Mascaros and the Cannons relating to the Listing Contracts were
taken under advisement. [R. 927 and 937-54 Memorandum Decision issued by trial court
following trial attached hereto as Addendum C]. Those claims were kept under
advisement for 68 days at which time Judge Lewis issued a Memorandum Decision
concluding that the Listing Contracts were voidable and unenforceable because they did
not accurately reflect the Mascaros' understanding that they would be one-day listings.
[R. 945-51].

The Mascaros and the Cannons then requested attorney fees pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56. [R. 972-78 and 979-1080]. Because Wardley's suit was not
without merit [R. 1173] and because it "was not asserted or pursued with the requisite
bad faith." [R. 1174-75] the requests for attorney fees were denied. To support that
decision the trial court stated that the Mascaros and the Cannons "failed to show that
Wardley's claims under the listing agreements were frivolous or of little weight or
importance having no basis in law or fact." [R. 1173-74 (citing Cady v. Johnson, 671
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)). The trial court also noted "that the listing agreements
entered into between Wardley and the Mascaros were voidable because of Mr. Hansen's
misconduct, [but] the legality of the listing agreements, a mixed fact and legal question,
was not entirely clear. Id.. Judge Lewis explained that her decision was reached "only
after extensively evaluating the trial testimony and carefully scrutinizing the numerous
documents entered into evidence, in light of the law." Id..
Judge Lewis' Ruling regarding Wardley's lack of bad faith in pursuing its claims
states "[t]he record does not provide any credible support for a finding that Wardley
pursued its claims to hinder, delay, defraud, or otherwise take unconscionable advantage
of Cannon or the Mascaros" and that it would not be equitable to award the Defendants
their attorney fees from Wardley. [R. 1175].
The Cannons appealed the trial court's order denying their request for attorneys
fees but did not oppose or dispute any of the trial court's factual findings. Wardley v.
Cannon atfflf4 & 7, 21 P.3d.

Because the Cannons did not challenge any of the factual findings or marshal any
evidence, the Court of Appeals stated "we must 'assume [] that the record supports the
findings of the trial court,' including the finding that Wardley's suit was not pursued in
bad faith. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). Consequently, because a
finding of bad faith is required before a court can award attorney fees under § 78-27-56,
our acceptance of this finding as true is fatal to [the Cannons] appeal" Wardley v.
Cannon at Tf 7.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the Cannons "novel theories of vicarious
liability" to awards of attorney fees. Id. atffif8-11.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

In order to collect attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56

three requirements must be met: (1) the parties seeking fees must have prevailed, (2) the
claim or defense asserted must have been meritless; and (3) must have been pursued in
bad faith. Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah App. 1997). The claims that
Wardley pursued against the Cannons were not meritless and were not pursued in bad
faith. There were numerous factual and legal issues presented and resolved at the fourday trial through the testimony of 14 witnesses and 65 exhibits. It took the trial court
over two months to reach its final decision and after hearing all the evidence it stated that
Wardley's claims were not frivolous or of little weight or importance having no basis in
law or fact. [R. 1173-74] (citing Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151). Furthermore, the

factual determination that Wardley's claims were not pursued in bad faith has not been
challenged on appeal and must govern the outcome of this case.
II.

The case of Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) is

distinguishable from the instant case and does not provide a basis for the Cannons to
recover attorney fees from Wardley because of Hansen's conduct. Hodges dealt with a
tort claim that involved numerous factual determination which were all resolved in the
plaintiffs' favor after trial. It also involved the knowledge and conduct of the defendant
company's managerial agent. The Cannons' claim for attorney fees from Wardley
involves complex factual determinations regarding bad faith that were resolved in favor
of Wardley and a statutory claim for attorney fees based solely upon the conduct of an
independent contractor. In Hodges this Court upheld the jury's determination that the
defendant company's managerial agent in charge of determining whether or not to pursue
criminal charges KNOWINGLY initiated criminal charges against an innocent
individual Id. at 157-58; lacked probable cause to initiate the prosecution, Id; and
pursued the criminal prosecution for an improper purpose Id. at 160-61. In the instant
case there is no evidence, whatsoever, that Wardley, or any managerial agent had any
knowledge of any improper conduct by Hansen.
III.

The Cannons' efforts to place themselves in the position of a defrauded

innocent third party are misplaced and do not provide them with a legal basis to recover
attorney fees from Wardley. In the instant case the Cannons did not rely upon or change
their position because of Wardley, Hansen or any improper conduct by Hansen. Section

78-27-56 is punitive in nature and the standards governing an employer's vicarious
liability for punitive damages should govern the outcome of this Appeal. Tort principles
of vicarious liability and imputation of knowledge should not govern claims for attorney
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
IV.

In Utah, attorney fees can only be recovered when provided for by contract

or statute. The evidence and findings in this case preclude an award of attorney fees in
this case regardless of Hansen's knowledge. The statutory mandates regarding attorney
fees should be strictly applied. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 states that to recover
attorney fees in a civil action the claim or defense asserted must be meritless AND
brought in bad faith. While questions of merit are matters of law, questions of bad faith
turn on the "subjective intent" of the party to the action, not the knowledge of a witness
or independent contractor. There is no evidence in the instant case that Wardley's
subjective intent amounted to bad faith.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CLAIMS WARDLEY PURSUED AGAINST THE CANNONS
WERE NOT MERITLESS AND WERE NOT PURSUED WITH BAD
FAITH.

A.

Wardley's Claims Were Not Meritless

Attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 "if the
court determines the acts or defense of the action (i) was without merit and (ii) not
brought or asserted in good faith." Valcarce 961 P.2d at 316 "to prove a claim is

'without merit', a party must show that the claim is 'frivoulous' or 'of little weight or
importance having no basis in law or fact."5 Chipman 934 P.2d at 1162.
This dispute involved a number of dispositive motions, sixty five exhibits and
four days of trial testimony. Even then, the trial court needed a significant amount of
time to sort through all of the evidence before it could make a ruling. Rather than
provide this Court with the trial testimony or the exhibits upon which the trial court's
decision was based, the Cannons have relied solely upon the trial court's finding that
Hansen inserted dates on four listing agreements that were inconsistent with the
Mascaro's understanding. The Cannons failed to point out the various Real Estate
Purchase Contracts that the Hansens presented to the Mascaros [R. 847-50] and totally
ignored the fact that the Mascaros believed they had a contract with Wardley or they
would not have filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract. [R. 28-39]. The
Cannons have also disregarded the numerous other efforts and steps which the Hansens
took to help the Mascaros sell their property. [R. 661-77]. Finally, but perhaps most
importantly, the Cannons did not provide this Court with any of the trial testimony,
which formulated the basis for the trial court's decision. [R. 1409-11; Notice of No
Transcript Requested].
In order to prove a claim is without merit, a party must show that the claim is
"frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Cady 671
P.2d at 151. The instant case involved complex factual and legal issues, including the
alleged modification of the listing agreements, the enforceability of the listing

agreements, whether the Cannons interfered with another buyer's purchase of the
property, whether the Mascaros refused to sell their property to a ready, willing and able
buyer brought into the transaction by Wardley, and whether the Cannons interfered with
the Wardley/Mascaro listing agreement. [R. 268-70, 271-92, 636 and 661-77]. After
reviewing all of the evidence, the trial court could not conclude that Wardley's claims
were "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." [R.
1173-74 (citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151)]. This Court should not make that conclusion
without at least reviewing the same evidence. The trial court and Court of Appeals
recognized that the legality of the listing agreements upon which Wardley's claims were
based, presented complicated questions of fact and law which were only resolved after
the trial court "extensively evaluated] the trial testimony and carefully scrutinized] the
numerous documents entered into evidence, in light of the law." [Id. See also Wardley
BH&G atfflf3 and 8 f.n. 4]. Even without the benefit of the trial testimony and the
numerous documents upon which the trial court's decision was based, the meritorious
nature of Wardley's claims should be recognized by this Court by affirming the Court of
Appeals Decision.
B.

Wardley's Claims Were Not Pursued in Bad Faith.

Even if Wardley's claims lacked merit, before attorney fees can be awarded
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, there must be a factual finding that Wardley did
not have a good faith belief in its claims. "Finding a lack of good faith turns on
subjective intent" of the party and for purposes of § 78-27-56 is synonymous with a

finding of "bad faith." Cady 671 P.2d at 151-52. See also Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171 and
Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315-16. To find that Wardley acted in "bad faith" by pursuing
these claims "the trial court must find that one or more of the following factors existed:
(i) [Wardley] lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question;
(ii) [Wardley] intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) [Wardley]
intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder,
delay, or defraud others." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 316 (citing Cady 671 P.2d at 151).
There is no evidence, indication or finding that Wardley: (1) lacked an honest belief in
the propriety of its claims; (2) that it intended to take unconscionable advantage of
anyone; (3) or that it knew its actions would hinder, delay or defraud others. To the
contrary, the trial court found that even though Hansen had improperly modified/inserted
dates on the listing agreements, when all the evidence was considered, Wardley had a
good faith basis from which to pursue the claims involved in this action. The Court of
Appeals properly recognized that Wardley's claims did not lack merit and were not
pursued in bad faith. This Court should do likewise.
In the Cady case, like in this case, a realty company sued a prospective seller of
real property for a commission. The trial court in that case found that the realtor's claims
were meritless and awarded the defendant its attorney fees. The Utah Supreme Court,
however, reversed and held that even though the suit may have been ill conceived and
without merit, there was no proof of bad faith which would support an award of attorney
fees. The Supreme Court explained:

[i]n the instant case, the trial court found lack of good faith because had
plaintiffs researched the issue as instructed at pre-trial conference, they
would have discovered they had no valid claim and they could have saved
the court valuable time by avoiding trial. We disagree that this conduct
constitutes bad faith. Plaintiffs were clearly pursuing a meritless claim and
better preparation might well have disclosed that to them. However, that
conduct does not rise to a lack of good faith. The evidence must also
affirmatively establish a lack of at least one of the three elements of good
faith heretofore discussed. There was no evidence that plaintiffs lacked an
honest (although ill-formed) belief in their claim; that they had an intent to
take an unconscionable advantage of defendants; nor that they had the
intent to, or knowledge that their suit would hinder, delay or defraud
defendants.
Cady, 671 P.2d at 152; (citing Tacoma Assoc, of Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453,
458, 433 P.2d 901, 904 (1967). Even if Wardley's claims were poorly researched and/or
ill-formed, its honest belief that a commission was due from the Cannons defeats the
Cannons' claim for attorney fees in this case.
H.

HODGES V. GIBSON PRODUCTS CO. IS DISTINGUISHABLE
FROM THE INSTANT CASE.

The case of Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) deals with
a tort claim for malicious prosecution and wrongful termination. In that case four
company employees went to the police and accused Hodges of stealing from the
company. The jury, however, determined that Hodges did not steal the employer's funds
and that conclusion was supported by the evidence. Id. at 157-58. The jury also found
that the employer did not even have probable cause to believe that Hodges had taken the
money. Id. at 159. Finally, the jury found that "[the employer] improperly used the
criminal prosecution [] to pressure her to pay [it] the missing money." Id. at 161. All of
those factual determinations were supported by admissible evidence. Principles of

Agency and Tort Law provided a means by which Hodges could pursue her tort claims
against her employer for malicious prosecution and wrongful termination. Those claims
prevailed and were upheld by this Court because of the employers' knowledge through
its managerial agent who had acted within the course and scope of his employment in
initiating the prosecution. Id at 163. This Court, however, pointed out that the
manager's knowledge could only be imputed to the employer if his wrongful conduct
was within the course and scope of his authority and was motivated to carry out the
employer's purposes. There is no evidence whatsoever, that Hansen had authority from
Wardley tofraudulentlychange dates on any listing agreements. The conduct
complained of here was outside the course and scope of Hansen's authority and cannot
serve as a basis to hold Wardley vicariously liable.
Hodges dealt with an employer's vicarious liability for a legal action pursued by
its managerial employee. In the instant case Wardley pursued a claim which, on the face
of all the documents that existed and the facts that were available to it, appeared to be
legitimate. Even though that was not ultimately the case, the information in question
came from an independent contractor, not a managerial employee. Additionally,
Wardley, unlike the employer in Hodges, did not have any reason to question or doubt
Hansen. Because Hansen was not a managerial agent, but instead was an independent
contractor of Wardley, his knowledge of the altered dates should not be imputed to
Wardley nor provide this Court with a basis upon which to find that Wardley pursued a
meritless action in bad faith. The Court of Appeals' Decision differentiating Hodges

from the instant case should be upheld and the Cannons' request for attorney fees should
be denied.
m.

THE SANCTIONS OF ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD ONLY BE
IMPOSED UPON BAD ACTORS, NOT THEDl PRINCIPALS.

The Cannons' Brief argues that they have been damaged by Hansen's fraud. The
elements of fraud, however, include reasonable reliance and a change of position. See
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). Hansen's conduct involved a
contract with the Mascaros not the Cannons. The Cannons were brought into this lawsuit
by allegations that they interfered with the prospective economic relations of Wardley
and because, on the face of the documents available to Wardley, it appeared that the
commission collected by the Cannons should have been paid to Wardley. The Cannons
argue that § 78-27-56 is remunerative rather than punitive. The goal of § 78-27-56,
however, is to send a message that certain conduct is not acceptable within our legal
system. The award of attorney fees due to the pursuit of a meritless action in bad faith is
intended to sanction the wrongdoer, similar to an award of punitive damages for
intentional or reckless disregard of the rights of another in the tort context. Principles
applicable to vicarious liability for punitive damages, therefore, should also govern this
case.
Vicarious liability for punitive damages for an employee's conduct only exists in
the following four circumstances:
(a) if the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of
the act;

(b) if the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in
employing or retaining him;
(c) if the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope
of employment; or
(d) if the principal or a managerial agent of the principal knowingly ratified or
approved the act.
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 63 (Utah 1991); (citing Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 217C (1958)).
None of those circumstances apply in this case. No one at Wardley authorized
Hansen's allegedly wrongful conduct. There is no evidence that Hansen was unfit or that
anyone at Wardley was reckless in employing or retaining him. Hansen was not
employed in a managerial capacity and finally Wardley never knowingly ratified or
approved of Hansen's conduct. The sanction represented by payment of the opposing
party's attorney fees should not, therefore, be based upon the simple tort doctrine of
respondeat superior liability through imputed knowledge.
The Cannons argued that justice requires they be reimbursed for their attorney
fees. Justice, however, does not require that that reimbursement come from Wardley. In
fact, as indicated above, the trial court concluded it would not be equitable for Wardley
to bear the burden of the Cannons' attorney fees. Justice does dictate that Hansen should
be personally responsible for any fees, costs or expenses incurred by the parties to this
lawsuit. The Cannons, however, chose not to pursue a crossclaim against Hansen. Had
the Cannons pursued that avenue of recovery they may have had a judgment for their

costs and fees. Wardley, however, should not be prejudiced by the Cannons failure to
avail themselves of relevant and available legal remedies.
IV.

EVEN IF HANSEN'S KNOWLEDGE IS IMPUTED TO WARDLEY
AND WARDLEY BECOMES VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR
HANSEN'S WRONGFUL CONDUCT. THE CANNONS ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES FROM WARDLEY IN
THIS CASE.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides for the award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party when the opposing party has pursued a meritless action which was not
brought or asserted in good faith. Subsection 2 of that code section, however, states that
the "court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under
subsection (1), but only if the court: ...(b) enters in the record the reason for not awarding
fees under provisions of Subsection (1)." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(2). In the instant
case the trial court entered several findings which justify not awarding any fees against
Wardley in this case, even if Wardley is charged with Hansen's conduct. Those findings
included:
1.

Wardley's suit was not without merit; [R. 1173].

2.

The evidence did not support the contention that Wardley's claims were
frivolous or of little weight; [R. 1173-74].

3.

Wardley did not have knowledge of Hansen's fraudulent conduct; [R.
1174].

4.

Wardley strongly believed it had a claim for unpaid commissions; Id

5.

Wardley's decision to bring a lawsuit under the listing agreements, which
on their face appeared to be legitimate, cannot be viewed with 20/20
hindsight and the benefit of approximately four days of trial testimony; Id.

6.

Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith; Id;

7.

The record does not provide any credible support for a finding that
Wardley pursued its claims to hinder, delay, defraud or otherwise take
unconscionable advantage of Cannon. [R. 1175]; and

8.

"The totality of facts and circumstances don't point to [an award of
attorney fees to Defendants from Wardley] as equitable. [R. 1175 and
1266].

The Court of Appeals' Decision at footnote 4 acknowledges that there are reasons
attorney fees should not be granted against Wardley in this case. In footnote 4 the Court
of Appeals states that "assuming arguendo that we were to [resolve whether Wardley's
claims were without merit or pursued in bad faith, the Cannons'] argument still fails.
Whether the listing agreements were legal was unclear. On their face the listing
agreements seemed legitimate. The trial court was required to hear four-day trial and to
weigh a significant amount of evidence to determine otherwise. The record does not
support a finding that Wardley 4"(i) lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the
activities in question; (ii)... intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii)
intended to act with the knowledge that [its] activities would hinder, delay, or defraud
others,' as is required for a finding of bad faith." Wardley v. Cannon, f.n. 4 f 8 (citing
Childs v. Calahoun, 1999 UT App. 359, \ 16, 993 P.2d 244 and quoting Cady v.
Johnson, 61 \ P.2d at 151). Wardley, therefore, should not be held responsible to pay the
Cannons' attorney fees in this case.

CONCLUSION
The Decision of the Utah State Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's ruling
denying the Cannons' request for attorney fees from Wardley should be upheld. The
Cannons failure to demonstrate that Wardley's claims were meritless or pursued in bad
faith defeats their claim for attorney fees from Wardley. Furthermore, tort principles of
vicarious liability are inapplicable to the instant situation. It would be inequitable, unjust
and contrary to statute to impute knowledge to Wardley in this case sufficient to justify
the sanction of making it pay attorney fees to Cannon in this case. For the reasons set
forth above the Cannons request for attorney fees should be denied and the decisions in
the trial court and the Utah State Court of Appeals should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted this / I/7 day of November, 2001.
SCALLEY & READING, P.C.
Attorneys for Wardley

Steven B. Smith

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the.
of November, 2001, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, WARDLEY BETTER HOMES &
GARDENS IN OPPOSITION TO MASCARO APPELLANTS PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI was deposited in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to
the following:
Mark O. Morris
David N. Wolf
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,
Plaintiff,

COURT'S RULING
CASE NO. 940907000

vs.
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI
MASCARO and TRACEY CANNON,
Defendants.

LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI
MASCARO,
Counter-claimants,
vs.
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,
Counterdefendant.

LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI
MASCARO,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES
HANSEN,
Third Party Defendants.
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The Court has before it a Notice to Submit, filed pursuant to
Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with
defendants' Tracey Cannon and Cannon Associates, Inc.

(Cannon)

Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Request for Oral
Argument and defendants/counterclaimants/third-party plaintiffs'
Leland

J. Mascaro

and Sheri Mascaro's

(Mascaros)

Attorney Fees and Request for Oral Argument.

Request

for

The Court having now

reviewed Cannons' and the Mascaros' Motions, Memoranda in support
and in opposition thereto, rules as stated herein.
At the outset,

the Court notes that both Cannon and the

Mascaros have requested oral argument.

This request is denied.

The Court is not satisfied that there is a need or basis to justify
setting this matter for oral argument. Both sides have done a fine
job of stating their positions in the pleadings and the Court is
very conversant with the facts, law and arguments.
In their respective motions, Cannon and the Mascaros request
attorney's fees pursuant to .Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56.

Section

78-27-56(1) provides that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall
award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith."

Under this

statute, attorney fees may be awarded only if the court determines

on
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that three requirements have been met: (1) the party seeking fees
prevailed; (2) the claim or defense asserted by the opposing party
was meritless; and (3) that claim or defense was asserted in bad
faith. With regard to each of these elements, the trial court must
make specific findings._£££ Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808
P.2d 1061,

1068 (Utah 1991) ("Specific findings further the ends

of justice by allowing appeals courts to better review the trial
court1s award.").
Both Cannon and the Mascaros assert that the Court should
grant them attorney's fees under § 78-27-56(1) because they are the
prevailing parties, and because Wardley's claims against them were
meritless and asserted in bad faith.

In support of this argument,

Cannon and the Mascaros rely on this Court's finding that thirdparty

defendant

Aries

Hansen

agreements with the Mascaros.

improperly

modified

the

listing

Cannon and the Mascaros argue that

Mr. Hansen's misconduct should be imputed to Wardley under the
theory of agency or respondeat superior and that Wardley is liable
to Cannon and the Mascaros for having to defend against Wardley's
meritless suit.
First, this Court does not agree that Wardley's suit was
"without merit".

Specifically, Cannon and the Mascaros have failed

on
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to show that Wardley's claims under the listing agreements were
"frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in
law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151

(Utah 1983).

While the Court subsequently determined that the listing agreements
entered into between Wardley and the Mascaros were voidable because
of Mr. Hansen's misconduct, the legality of the listing agreements,
a mixed fact and legal question, was not entirely clear.

The Court

reached its decision only after extensively evaluating the trial
testimony and carefully scrutinizing the numerous documents entered
into evidence, in light of the law.

Wardley has represented that

it did not have knowledge of Mr. Hansen's fraudulent activity and
strongly believed that it had a claim for unpaid commissions.
Wardley's decision to bring a lawsuit under the listing agreements,
which on their face appeared to be legitimate, cannot be viewed
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight and the benefit of approximately
four days of trial testimony.
Furthermore, the Court determines that Wardley's Complaint was
not asserted or pursued with the requisite bad faith.
671 P.2d at 151-52.

See

Cady,

"In order to find that a party "lacked good

faith," or in other words, acted in "bad faith," the trial court
must find that one or more of the following factors existed: (1)
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an

honest

question;

belief

(2)

the

in

the

party

propriety
intended

of
to

the
take

unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) the party intended to or
acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would
hinder, delay, or defraud others." Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158
(Utah Ct. App. 1997);
omitted).

See also Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (citation

The record does not provide any credible support for a

finding that Wardley pursued its claims to hinder, delay, defraud,
or

otherwise

Mascaros.

As

take
a

unconscionable
result,

this

advantage

Court

of

cannot

Cannon

find

bad

or

the

faith.

Consequently, the Court determines that Cannon and the Mascaros do
not appear to be entitled to attorney's fees under §78-27-56.
Additionally, the totality of facts and circumstances don't point
to

this

as equitable.

Accordingly,

Cannon's

Motion

and

the

Mascaros' Request is denied.
Counsel for Wardley is to prepare an Order consistent with,
but not limited to, this Court's Ruling, and submit the same to the
Court for review and signature.
Finally, the Court seeks clarification as to whether Wardley
is still being represented by the law firm of Nielsen & Senior.
The Court has received a Notice to Submit filed by the law firm of
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Nielsen & Senior in connection with their Motion to Withdraw from
representing the Hansens.

While Nielsen & Senior is apparently

seeking to withdraw as counsel only for the Hansens, it now appears
that Wardley has retained the law firm of Scalley & Reading to
represent it in this matter. The Court has received pleadings from
Scalley & Reading on behalf of Wardley.

(See Memorandum in

Opposition to Mascaro and Cannon's Motions for Attorney's Fees).
Until further clarification is received and an Order entered, this
Court will continue to consider Nielsen & Senior as counsel for
Wardley.

They are directed to contact the clients and Scalley &

Reading to clarify this issue.
Dated this / ^ day of December, 1938

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

f'jT •:
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following, this
\Q

day of December, 1998:

Steven B. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff Wardley
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Neil R. Sabin
J. Craig Smith
Annette F. Sorensen
Attorneys for Plaintiff Wardley
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Defendants Mascaro
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark O. Morris
Attorney for Defendant Cannon
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John R. Bucher
Attorney for Third Party Defendants Hansen
1343 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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Steven B. Smith, #5797
SCALLEY & READING, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Wardley
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,
Plaintiff,
v.
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI MASCARO,
TRACEY CANNON and ASSOCIATES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

]i
)
]
'

ORDER DENYING
ATTORNEY'S FEES

;
)

Civil No. 940907000 CN

])

Judge: Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants Tracey Cannon and Cannon and Associates ("Cannon") and
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro
("Mascaros"), after a trial in the above matter, petitioned the Court for an award of attorney's
fees from Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens ("Wardley"),
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-56. Memoranda in support and in opposition to
those Motions were filed and those Motions were submitted for decision. The Court having
reviewed the Motions, Memoranda, and being fully informed, now makes and enters the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both Cannons and Mascaros claimed a right to attorney's fees pursuant

to Section 78-27-56 (1) contending that Wardley's claims were meritless and asserted in bad
faith.
2.

Wardley's claims, however, were not "without merit."

3.

Even though the listing agreements entered between Wardley and the

Mascaros were voidable because of the misconduct of Arlis Hansen, the legality of the listing
agreements consisted of mixed factual and legal questions which were not entirely clear.
There was no evidence presented that Wardley independently knew of Mr. Hansen's
fraudulent conduct, and there was evidence that Wardley strongly believed that it had a valid
claim for unpaid commissions. The evidence indicated: (a) Wardley had an honest belief in
the propriety of the activities in question; (b) Wardley did not intend to take unconscionable
advantage of others; and (c) Wardley did not intend to or act with knowledge that its
activities would hinder, delay, and defraud Cannon or the Mascaros.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Cannon and Mascaros failed to demonstrate that Wardley's claims were

"frivolous," or "of little weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact" as set forth in
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).
2.

Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith.

3.

The totality of facts and circumstances would make it inequitable to

force Wardley to pay Cannons' and Mascaros' attorney's fees.

%<tylofl>

DATED this

2A

dayofMarchrl999.
By the Court:

Judge Leslie Lewis

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the \8& day of March, 1999, a true and correct copy of
Wardley's Order Denying Attorney's Fees was deposited in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
James C. Haskins, Esq.
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
357 South 200 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark O. Morris, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
John Bucher, Esq.
1343 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, :

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 940907000

Plaintiff,
vs.
LELAND J. MASCARO, et al.,

:

Defendants.
LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI
MASCARO,
Counter-claimants,
vs.
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES £. GARDENS, :
Counterdefendant.

LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI
MASCARO,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

:

vs.
RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES HANSEN,
Third Party Defendants.

:

This case came before the Court for trial beginning on June 8,
1998, and continuing through June 11, 1998.

The Court having
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received testimony and heard argument from counsel, ruled from the
bench that the plaintiffs had not established a cause of action
against defendant Tracy Cannon with respect to their claim that
defendant Tracy Cannon's conduct violated the Utah Administrative
Code.

Specifically, the Court found that defendant Tracy Cannon's

conduct was not unprofessional or unethical under the totality of
the facts and circumstances and based upon the testimony of certain
witnesses, including defendant Tracy Cannon and Rodney "Butch"
Dailey, whom the Court found to be credible.

The Court also ruled

that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof in connection
with

their

claim

that

defendant

Tracy

Cannon

intentionally

interfered with the plaintiff's prospective economic relations with
respect

to

the

Wetcor/Michael

Ahlin

deal,

the

Michael

Brodsky/Hamlet Development deal and the Boulder deal (see factual
discussion below).

Further, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs

had not met their burden of proof as to their claim that defendant
Cannon's failure to remit the commissions on the sale of the
defendant
conversion.

Mascaros'

property

to

the

plaintiff

constituted

The remaining issues raised in the Second Amended

Complaint, the Counterclaim, and the Third Party Complaint were
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taken under advisement by the Court for further, more in-depth
consideration.

FACTUAL 3ACKGRQVND
This Court finds that credible testimony adduced at trial,
establishes

the

following

facts.

The Mascaros

("Mascaros")

defendants and third-party plaintiffs, were first contacted by
third-party defendant Aries Hansen ("Mr. Hansen") in the summer of
1993.

Mr. Hansen, who represented himself to be the agent of the

plaintiff

and counterdefendant

("Wardley"),

inquired whether

selling approximately

Wardley Better Homes

& Gardens

the Mascaros were interested in

128 acres of real property which is the

subject of this lawsuit.

Mr. Hansen informed the Mascaros that he

was looking for property in that area for Michael L. Ahlin

("Mr.

Ahlin"), President of Impact Development Corporation d/b/a Wetcor.
After his initial meeting with the Mascaros, Mr. Hansen met
with

defendant

and third-party plaintiff

Sheri Mascaro

Mascaro") and requested that she sign an Option agreement.

("Mrs.
Mrs.

Mascaro signed, but did not date, the Option agreement (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1 ) . The terms of this Option agreement included a 20 day
duration and gave Mr. Hansen, and his wife, third-party defendant
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Ruth Mary Hansen ("Mrs. Hansen"), or their assigns, the right to
purchase the Mascaros' property.
When Mr. Hansen discovered that defendant and third-party
plaintiff Leland Mascaro ("Mr. Mascaro") was the actual owner of
the property,

he asked

the Mascaros

to sign

a second

Option

agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 ) . The terms of the second Option
agreement, dated September 14, 1993, were identical to the first
Option agreement and was signed by both the Mascaros.

According to

the trial testimony, it was also on this date that Mrs. Mascaro
informed Mr. Hansen that Century 21 All West Inc. ("Century 21")
had an exclusive listing agreement on the property.

The Century 21

listing agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 30) had been signed by Mr.
Mascaro on May 28, 1993, and provided for a six month duration.
The Court found Mr. Hansen's testimony that he was not aware of the
Century 21 agreement was lacking in credibility.

To the contrary,

the Court finds that the Century 21 agreement was disclosed to Mr.
Hansen and that he requested Mrs. Mascaro to obtain a one-party
exemption from Mr. Jerard Dinkelman, the principal broker under the
Century

21 Agreement.

Mrs. Mascaro

obtained

the

exemption

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 29) on September 14, 1993. This exemption was
acquired before the second Option agreement was executed.
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It further appears from the testimony that when Mr. Ahlin did
not make an immediate offer, Mr. Hansen engaged in other actions
with

the

Mascaros,

including

having

them

write

a

letter

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3), dated October 6, 1993, to put pressure on
Mr. Ahlin to make the deal.

Mrs. Mascaro conceded at trial that

this letter, stating that she and her husband had been contacted by
another developer offering ernest money on the parcels, was a
fabrication.
On October 12, 1993, Mr. Ahlin made an offer on the property
through a Real Estate Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) of
the same date.

In addition to the Real Estate Purchase Contract,

Mr. Hansen prepared a Dual Agency Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4)
which was signed by Mr. Ahlin and Mrs. Hansen.

The Court finds

this Agreement is significant because Mr. Hansen had continuously
represented to the Mascaros that he was their agent exclusively.
In addition, Mr. Rod Gordon testified that he was Mr. Ahlin's agent
and that it was inappropriate for the Hansens to present a Dual
Agency Agreement for Mr. Ahlin's consideration and signature.

Also

of significance is the Sales Agency Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit
4) which the Hansens prepared for the Mascaros' signature.

A hand-

written notation on the top of this contract expressly states that
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it is a single party listing and that the single party is Wetcor.
All of these documents were sent to the Mascaros and to their legal
counsel, Mr. Mitch Olsen.

Mr. Olsen testified that he advised the

Mascaros not to sign the documents and offered to draft an original
real

estate purchase

contract

which

included

a provision

for

commission to be paid to the Hansens in the event that Mr. Ahlin
consummated the purchase of the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16).
Based

on Mr. Olsen's advice, the Mascaros did not act on Mr.

Ahlin's offer but continued to negotiate with him.

In addition,

the testimony is clear that no listing agreement was ever executed
or contemplated by the Mascaros at that time.
On November 14, 1993, Mr. Hansen came to the Mascaros' home
with a number of documents.
Option

Agreement

At this meeting, Mr. Hansen brought an

(Defendant's

Exhibit

89), a

Limited

Agency

Disclosure Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), a blank Real Estate
Purchase

Contract

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit

26), and

four

listing

agreements (''Listing Agreements") with Salt Lake Board of Realtors
Land Data Input Forms
testimony,

Mr.

Hansen

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 17 - 20).
acknowledged

that

in

In his

preparing

documents the night before, he had predated many of them.

these
The

Court finds that Mr. Hansen's preparation of these documents was
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unsolicited and that Mr. Hansen purposely met with the Mascaros on
a Sunday without the presence of their legal counsel.

It appears

to the Court that Mr. Hansen's urgency in preparing these documents
and having the Mascaros sign them was based on the expiration of
the second Option agreement.

It further appears from the Mascaros'

testimony that Mr. Hansen's scheme was to have the Mascaros present
an offer to Mr. Ahlin with the expectation that he would purchase
a small portion of the acreage and agree to an option on the
remainder of the land.

However, because the Mascaros and Mr.

Hansen did not yet know how many acres Mr. Ahlin would actually be
willing

to purchase,

the principle

Purchase Contract were left blank.

terms

of

the Real

Estate

In addition, only the first of

the four Listing Agreements contained an expiration date.
The Court finds that the first Listing Agreement (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 17A) , in its unaltered state, reflects the actual agreement
between the Mascaros and Mr. Hansen.

This Listing Agreement was

set to expire on November 15, 1993, one day after Mr. Hansen's
Sunday meeting with the Mascaros.

The Court finds that Mr. Hansen

altered the date on this Listing Agreement from November 15, 1993
to November

15, 1994.

This finding is based on the credible

testimony of the Mascaros and the Court's comparison of documents
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where changes are initialed (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), with the
Listing Agreement marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17A, where the
change in the expiration date has no initials.

The Court further

finds that with respect to the other three Listing Agreements,
which were blank with respect to the expiration dates, these were
filled in by

Mr. Hansen, subsequent to the Mascaros' signature,

with "November 14, 1994" dates. The credible testimony established
that Mr. Hansen's conduct in changing and/or writing

in the

expiration dates, was engaged in without the knowledge and the
approval of the Mascaros.

In addition, the dates alluded to and

written by Mr. Hansen were contrary to the parties' agreement and
clear understanding that the Listing Agreements would expire in one
day.
This Court also finds that Mr. Ahlin did subsequently sign
both the Option Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Contract,
and Mrs. Hansen accepted an earnest money check for $4,000.
Further, it is clear that the deal between the Mascaros and Mr.
Ahlin subsequently failed.

After an attempt to arbitrate the

matter of the earnest money, the title company released the $4,000
earnest money to Mr. Ahlin's assignees.
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This Court also finds that around this same time, another
potential purchaser of the property, Michael Brodsky, President of
Hamlet Development, began to negotiate with the Mascaros.

Mr.

Brodsky testified that he proposed purchasing the property in
stages and thought that he and the Mascaros had reached a verbal
agreement

on the

sale.

However, before

the

agreement was

finalized, Mr. Brodsky was informed by the Mascaros that a sale of
the property had occurred.
signed

a

one

Associates.

year

listing

In

September

agreement

1994,

with

the Mascaros

defendant

Cannon

In October 1994, the Mascaros signed a Real Estate

Purchase Agreement agreeing to sell the property to defendant
Tracey Cannon ("Ms. Cannon") .

The Mascaros and Ms. Cannon closed

on this property on May 11, 1995. Ms. Cannon received a commission
from the sale of $115,338.16.
LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Court determines
that the listingagreements
entered
Into
between
Wardley
and the Mascaros
are
voidable
because
they were secured
by fraud in the
inducement.

In its Second Amended Complaint, Wardley claims that the
Mascaros have breached their Listing Agreements with Wardley by
refusing to pay Wardley the 7% commission provided for in the
Listing Agreements upon the sale of the property to Ms. Cannon.
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Wardley argues that the sale to Ms. Cannon was entered into within
the one-year term of the Listing Agreements. According to Wardley,
when the sale on the property to Ms. Cannon closed, the contractual
requirements for Wardley's earned commission had been satisfied.
In their Counterclaim

and Third

Party Complaint against

Wardley and the Hansens, the Mascaros contend they were induced to
sign the Listing Agreements in reliance on false representations
made to them by Mr. Hansen.

The representations which the Mascaros

claim were fraudulent are:

(1) that Mr. Hansen told them that he

would only receive a commission for the sale of the Mascaros'
property to Wetcor if they signed the Listing Agreements and (2)
that the Listing Agreements would be valid for only one day and
would apply only to the Wetcor purchase.

The Mascaros also claim

that Wardley breached its contract with them by failing to list the
property on the MLS, and by failing to appropriately market the
property.
Under Utah law, a person may rely upon positive assertions
made by another, Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980),
and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured party to avoid
the contract.

Berkely Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d
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The nine essential elements of fraudulent

inducement (fraud) are:
"(1) that a representation was made; (2)
concerning a presently existing material fact;
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge
upon
which
to
base
such
representation;
(5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act
(9) to his injury and damage."
Meibos, 607 P.2d at 800.
The Court determines that the Mascaros have proven fraudulent
inducement because they have presented evidence supporting all of
its elements.

This Court finds most significant the fact that

there are inconsistencies between the written terms of the Listing
Agreements

and the Mascaros' expressed

intention to limit Mr.

Hansen's representation to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and to limit the
duration of his representation to one day.

These inconsistencies

can only be reconciled with a finding that Mr. Hansen fraudulently
represented that the Listing Agreements would be limited to oneparty and would expire in one day to induce the Mascaros to sign
the Listing Agreements.

As part of his fraudulent scheme, the
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Court finds that Mr, Hansen altered the November 15, 1993, date
which was originally found on the first Listing Agreement and added
expiration dates to the remaining three Listing Agreements to
reflect an unagreed and unintended one-year duration.
Mr.

Hansen

unilaterally

modified

the

Listing

It appears

Agreements

to

improperly expand the scope of his representation beyond that
contemplated by the Mascaros.

The Court finds that Mr. Hansen's

modifications were made without the Mascaros' knowledge and at a
time when they did not have counsel available on the benefit of
necessary legal advice.

Based on the Mascaros' testimony, which

the Court found to be credible, they were induced into signing
incomplete

drafts of the Listing Agreements during

a Sunday

meeting, when their legal counsel was apparently unavailable,
because of Mr. Hansen's representation that it was the only way for
him to receive a commission on the deal and his assurances that the
final

version

limitations

of

the

Listing

they had discussed.

Agreements

would

contain

the

In addition, the Mascaros'

testified that they failed to take any additional precautions such
as filling out the blank spaces because of their belief that Mr.
Hansen had their best interests in mind.

On this topic, the Court

found Mrs. Mascaro's statement that "blind trust walked in and care
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walked out" to be a particularly compelling statement concerning
the Mascaros' reliance upon Mr. Hansen's representations and the
opportunity for deception by Mr. Hansen.

The Court finds that Mr.

Hansen took full advantage of this opportunity by arriving for a
hastily scheduled meeting with the Mascaros, whom Mr. Hansen knew
to be represented by legal counsel, on a Sunday, when counsel would
be unlikely to be available.
Overall, the Court found that the Mascaros' belief that they
were operating under a one-day, one-party listing agreement was
corroborated by documents received into evidence and the totality
of

credible

Contract

trial

testimony.

For

instance,

the

Sale Agency

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) presented to the Mascaros and

signed by Mrs. Hansen imparts the Hansens' acknowledgment of the
Mascaros' expressed intention to limit the Hansens' listing to "a
single party listing . . . The single party is Wetcor."

Further,

the Court finds that Mr. Hansen was aware of the Century 21 Listing
and was fully cognizant he could represent the Mascaros only if he
could obtain a one-party exemption.

Mr. Hansen's request that Mrs.

Mascaro obtain a one-party exemption from Century 21 is congruent
with

the

Mascaros'

express

reservations

that

their

listing

agreement with the Hansens be limited to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and
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with the Hansens' recognition that their representation had to be
limited to one-party so as not run afoul of the Century 21 Listing.
Next, it is significant to the Court that the change in the
expiration date on the first Listing Agreement was not initialed.
When compared to other documents where changes were initialed by
the Mascaros, the lack of initials on the altered expiration date
strongly suggests to the Court that the date was modified after the
Mascaros signed this Listing Agreement and without their knowledge
or permission.

The Hansens' actions and the trail of documents

speak loudly and convincingly that the Mascaros signed the Listing
Agreements

only

because

of

Mr.

Hansen's

fraudulent

misrepresentations and false assurances concerning the duration and
scope of these agreements.

In reaching this determination, the

Court has given due consideration to all of the evidence, including
the Mascaros' confessed lack of expertise in real estate matters
and the particular facts surrounding Mr. Hansen's insistence that
they sign the Listing Agreements on a Sunday, when they did not
have access to their legal counsel.

The existence of these proven

facts in this case defeats Wardley's recovery upon the Listing
Agreements.

This Court concludes it would be inequitable, would be
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unjust, and unlawful for this Court to enforce agreements, procured
through fraudulent inducement.
The Court notes that there are also other possible grounds on
which

the

Mascaros

could

avoid

liability

Agreements, including the doctrine of mistake.

under

the

Listing

However, since the

Court finds that the Listing Agreements are voidable on the grounds
of

fraudulent

inducement,

the

Court

deems

it

unnecessary

to

consider alternative theories.
To summarize, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim
that the Mascaros breached the Listing Agreements.

Specifically,

the Court rules that the Listing Agreements are unenforceable.
Further, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim that Ms.
Cannon interfered with Wardley' s economic relations with respect to
the Mascaros.

Since the Listing Agreements were unenforceable,

Wardley did not have viable economic relations with the Mascaros,
with which Ms. Cannon could interfere.
With respect to the Mascaros' Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint, the Court's ruling
unenforceable

renders moot

that the Listing Agreements are

the Mascaros' claim

that

they are

entitled to attorney's fees and costs as specified within the terms
of the Listing Agreements.

In other words, in disaffirming the
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terms of the Listing Agreements, the Mascaros cannot seek to
selectively

reinstate

only

certain

portions

Agreements which are favorable to them.

of

the

Listing

The same concept applies

to the Mascaros' claim that Wardley breached the terms of the
Listing Agreements.

As

stated previously,

since

fraudulent

inducement has been proven, the terms of the Listing Agreement are
not enforceable or binding on either the Mascaros or Wardley.

In

so ruling, the Court has essentially placed the Mascaros in the
same position that they were in before the Listing Agreements were
executed.
With respect to the Mascaros' claim for damages on fraud, it
is this Court's view that the Mascaros have been restored to their
former position by this Court's determination that the Listing
Agreements are void.

Moreover, while the Mascaros may have

suffered emotional angst over the Hansens' conduct and whether
their property would be sold, there is no evidence that this
distress resulted in any compensatory damages. As a corollary, the
Mascaros have not presented any evidence that they have suffered a
pecuniary loss, particularly in light of their sale of the property
to Ms. Cannon under more beneficial terms than were offered by the
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Accordingly, the Court denies the Mascaros'

claim for damages.
Counsel for the Mascaros is to prepare an Order and Findings
consistent with, but not limited to the content of this Ruling
within fifteen (15) days.
Dated this r~~Xx/d^y-of^August,^1998 ,
"tr

iiiV 0

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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